Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

5-26-1954

Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co.
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co." (1954). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 246.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/246

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

May 1954]

CITY OF Los ANGELEs

v.

BELRIDGE OrL Co.

823

[42 C.2d 823; 271 P.2d 5]

[L. A. No. 22586.

In Bank.

May

CITY OF LOS ANGEI1ES, Appellant, v. BELl~IDGE OIL
COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Licenses-Construction of License Laws.-While license tax
laws are to be construed against municipality and in favor of
taxpayer, it is fundamental that judicial construction should
be in keeping with natural and probable legislative purpose,
avoid conflict, and harmonize all applicable provisions of law
on subject, if possible.
[2] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-Where problem involves
construction of particular section of a taxing ordinance, ordinance should be looked to in its entirety and its provisions
construed together.
[3] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-A city ordinance section
imposing a license tax on those "manufacturing and selling"
or "selling" goods at wholesale, not specifically licensed by
other sections of ordinance, was intended to cover all businesses
engaged in selling goods at wholesale in city regardless of
whether they are engaged in "manufacturing and selling" or
merely "selling"; it is immaterial that the goods sold are produced in remote areas, whether they are produced in a company owned plant or purchased from an independent producer, or whether selling is a small or major part of total
effort.
[4] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-In city ordinance imposing a license tax on those "manufacturing and selling" or
"selling" goods at wholesale, the term "selling" may not be
construed to mean only selling of a merchandising nature,
where there is no requirement that seller must be in merchandising business before transaction can be called a sale, and
where another part of ordinance provides that phrase "selling
goods, wares and merchandise" shall include persons engaged
in "fabricating, serving or supplying" goods for a price.
[5] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-A corporation engaged in
producing crude oil and natural gas from wells outside county
is subject to provisions of city ordinance imposing a license
tax on those engaged in "selling goods, wares or merchandise
at wholesale" within city, where gross receipts of corporation
are derived from sale of such merchandise, most negotiations
for these sales were conducted through corporation's city office,
[1] See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 5; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 4 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-6] Licenses,§ 16; [7-9] Licenses,§ 9;
[10 J Constituional Law, § 48; [11, 12] J_,icenses, § 59 (2).
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such as production and delivery of
since such activity can constitutionally be taxed
even though goods never enter its
territorial limits.
[8] Id.- Power to License or Tax- Territorial Limitations.Where ordinance imposes license tax on those engaged in activity of selling in city, city can only base tax on such selling
activities as are carried out within its territorial limits; gross
receipts attributable to selling activities conducted outside
city should not be included.
[9] Id.-Power to License or Tax- Territorial Limitations.-To
allow a city to levy a license tax based on gross receipts
attributable to selling activities outside city would be an unreasonable discrimination and a denial of equal protection of
the law.
[10] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construction.-Where a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the
other unconstitutional in whole or in part, court will adopt
construction which, without doing violence to reasonable meaning of language used, will render it valid in its entirety or free
from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other
construction is equally reasonable.
[11] Licenses-Enforcement of License Tax-Limitation of Actions.-City's cause of action for recovery of business license
taxes is governed by three-year statute of limitations applicable
to "an action upon a
created by statute, other than
a penalty or forfeiture" (Code Civ.
§ 338, subd. 1), and
four-year period
Code Civ.
§ 343, for an
action for relief not otherwise
for by statute, cannot
apply.
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional
Constitutional Law, § 96 et seq.

§ 61 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
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[12] !d.-Enforcement of License Tax-Limitation of Actions.Three-year period of limitation of Code Civ. Proc., § 338,
subd. 1, which is applicable to city's cause of action for recovery of business license taxes, runs from time cause of action
accrues, which is when tax becomes delinquent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Roy L. Herndon, ,Judge. Reversed.
Action to recover license taxes.
reversed.

Judgment for defendant

Ray L. Chesebro and Roger Arnebergh, City Attorneys,
Bourke Jones, Assistant City Attorney, and ,James A. Doherty,
Deputy City Attorney, for Appellant.
Wellborn, Barrett & Rocli, Vernon Barrett and F. C. L.
Head for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in an
action to recover business license taxes from the defendant.
All the facts were stipulated to, and each party moved for
summary judgment. The motion of defendant company was
granted.
By its complaint in this action plaintiff sought a judgment
in the amount of $9,768.30 as unpaid business license taxes
owing for the years 1948-1950, inclusive. 'l'his claim is based
on the ground that plaintiff has a right, under the provisions
of section 21.166 of the Los Angeles City Tax Ordinance.
to impose a business license tax on defendant measured by the
company's gross receipts. Section 21.166 provides that
'' Every person manufacturing and selling any goods, wares
or merchandise at wholesale, or selling goods, wares or merchandise at wholesale, and not otherwise specifically licensed
by other provisions of this Article, shall pay for each calendar
year, or portion thereof, the sum of $8.00 for the first $20,000,
or less, of gross receipts, and, in addition . . . ''
Defendant company is engaged in the production and sale
of crude oil and natural gas. All of its wells are located
in Kern County. which is the scene of all productive operations. The field office of the defendant is located in Kern
County while the main office is situated in the ci.ty of Los
Angeles. Its various products which are marketed under longterm contracts, are delivered to the purchasers directly at the
field plants and never enter the territorial limits of the city
of Los Angeles.
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The board of directors of defendant company meets in
Los Angeles, most of the company's banking is done in Los
Angeles and the corporate officers spend the major portion of
their time at the main office in Los Angeles. Negotiations for
the sale of defendant's products are conducted in part at the
main office, in part at the offices of purchasers and in part by
mail, telegraph or telephone communications between the defendant's main office in Los Angeles and the customer. Defendant company signs all contracts at its main office.
All obligations, including payrolls, are paid from the head
office except emergency wage payments and disbursements
for miscellaneous items, which are paid from a checking account in Bakersfield carrying an average balance of between
$2,000 and $3,000. The main office makes all purchases, except
those of an emergency nature, and payment for the sales of all
items sold by defendant are received from purchasers at the
main office and deposited in Los Angeles bank accounts. Based
upon these facts the plaintiff city takes the position that the
defendant company is engaged in selling in the city of Los
Angeles the oil and gas it produces in Kern County, and that
it is therefore subject to the tax provided for in section 21.166
of the Los Angeles city tax ordinance.
Defendant's theory of the case is that the company's operations are not such as to make it taxable under the provisions
of section 21.166, and that even if that section is applicable,
plaintiff city has no constitutional right to levy a tax under
its provisions based on defendant's total gross receipts. Defendant also contends that the city's right to a recovery for
the year 1948 is barred by the applicable limitation provisions of section 338, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
In substance the principal problem presented is one of construction-construction as to the scope and intended purview
of section 21.166 of the l.Jos Angeles tax ordinance. Plaintiff
city contends that defendant company is a person selling
goods, wares and merchandise at wholesale within the meaning
of section 21.166. Defendant company claims that it is not.
Defendant argues that section 21.166 covers two types of
businesses. 'fhose which are engaged in the "manufacturing
and selling" of goods, wares or merchandise at wholesale and
those which are engaged in ''selling'' of goods, wares or
merchandise at wholesale. 'rhis contention is based upon the
ground that if "selling" by its own force includes "mamlfacturing and selling'' there would have been no reason to
separately mention "manufacturing and selling." In view of
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tllis language, ~efen~nt argu~s thattne tebn 'fselli1tg-" is
n~t . int~nded toinciudeHlrlall,1lfacturing and selling" a;nd
therefore it ne~essarily follows that the term ''~rellil'lg" .was
not intended to include such. activities as «:producing .and
selling"or Hmining andselling~" Based upon this. preDlise,
dt.lfend~nt .co11cludes that the inference is clear that the te:rm
"s~Iling'' is o11ly intended to cover businesses of a merchandising natl1re,. 'Yhere .. selling, rather tha!l. the 'Creation or
Ca);!tnre of somethin,g tQ sell, is the essence of the ente,rprise;
a11d therefore since the dominant portion of defendant's ~11si~
ness is the capture ofso:tn.ething to .sell, section 21.166 i,s not
appli~ble.
.
.
.. ·. .
. . . ..
. ...•.
There. seems to be no do11bt that. the defendantcompff,ily
~as.engaged .in.selling, since a company whichderiyes several
million .dollars. a year from tl}e sale of .petroleum products
is 9bvi?1lsly engaged in· selling those prmiucts; . Jl:oweyer, we
~till hay~ .the.· pro})lem of whether .the defendant . c?mpau:r
yvas;a.:person ''selling'' within the meaning .of.section 21.166.
. [lJ .In analyzing thE} scope and :neaiJing of a tax ordinance
o.f.this type, we are aware that tax laws .are to b~ c()nstr1led
as-aillst. th~ municipality and in favor 0~ .. the taxpayer, buf}t
:tutH'It ~o be ;remembered that such a rule does not take
precedence oyer ot'!ler fundamental rules of statutory. eon~
.~traction, .. It is fundamental th~t H~udicial construeti1:1n
sh(.lttld be i11 keeph1g V~Tiththe natural ap.d probable legislative.
p"(lrp.os;e, anCI. avoid cohl}:ict,. f1nd hf),rmonize all .the. applicable
pl'~Visio!ls of the laW'onthe srd>jeet if .possible." (MeQuillin1
Mup.icip~L Corp(jrations, 3d ea., voL .16,·Taxation,. ··~ 44.12.)
~J ·. A.l~o where the problem involves the eonstl'uetion of a paf~
fieul~rsecti~n or a tanllS' ordinance, the o;rdinalJ.ee.sholl,ld be
looke~ to i:u its e!ltir~ty ana its provisions constru~d. together~
(Hfatnma'f(, v. Oity ~!'Alameda, 162 Cal.. 648. [124.P. ~a}:)
•. In .the ease at< bar, th,e sectimi··inquestion. (21,16~) ts·. bu.t
~ne s~all J)a;J_'t. of •Ordina;nee No. ·77,000 .. whiCh. is .~he licen~e
ordinan~e ~f the city- of Los Arigeles. ·• Considering th~ ordi"
n~;nc~ a~ a whole, we. :find .that jt · ~ont~ins various int~oduo.;
t(:jr! secti~n~ ~overi11g SU<(h it~ms as definitions~ int~rpr~ta• ·
til)'~. e:tlfo:t;'e(lll1ent, .. P¥na1tiesl and··Iieense transfers, .f~ll(}W~d
by a ~eat :nan:r sections settin~ out the tax lialiility of spec~~
b~s~I1ess enterprises< stwh as J;l.otels,lautldrys, th~atel's, 6U
~el~s locat~d :in the ~ity ofLos .Angeles: etc. .Asi4~ f~e:m
tM .se~tio!l.,s ref;errifi~ t~ !!Pecifie. b~iness?s, the ordinance contajn~Jlrree ~o-~8,lled H cateb.-alP' sections: Section 21.166 }>ro~
Vide~ that '':Elvery person. :rn.anufactuHng and selling any
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goods, wares, or merchandise at wholesale, or selling goods,
wares, or merchandise at wholesale, and not otherwise specifically licensed by other provisions of this Article, shall pay ;
. . . "; section 21.167 covers those who manufacture and sell
or sell goods at retail and who are not licensed by other provisions; and section 21.190 provides that ''Every person engaged in any trade, calling, occupation, vocation, profession
or other means of livelihood, as an independent contractor
and not as an employee of another, and not specifically licensed
by other provisions of this Article, shall pay. . . . " -While
these other sections are not in issue here, a study of their
provisions and of the ordinance as a whole is helpful in construing the intended scope and meaning of section 21.166.
An analysis of the ordinance in its entirety makes it
apparent that even though several hundred types of businesses
are specifically provided for it is almost impossible to cover
each and every type of business by a specific section. For
this reason the legislative body found it expedient to include
three "catch-all" sections which were intended to cover those
business enterprises not specifically taxed by the other sections. Such "catch-all" provisions are not considered too
vague and theyhave been upheld by the courts. (City of Los
Angeles v. Rancho Homes, Inc., 40 Cal.2d 764 [256 P.2d 305] .)
There can be no doubt that the legislative body intended
the "catch-all" sections to be sufficiently broad to cover all
business enterprises not licensed under other sections of the
ordinance. \Vith this purpose in mind it is obvious that the
language used in eaeh of the three "catch-all" sections was
intended to be such as would cover a wide range of activities.
Our problem here is to determine whether the language of one
of these "catch -all" sections, section 21.166, is sufficiently
broad to include the business operations of defendant company.
[3] Keeping in mind the broad scope and purpose of
section 21.166 it becomes apparent that it was intended to
coyer all businesses engaged in manufacturing and selling at
wholesale in the city and also those businesses which merely
engaged in selling at wholesale in the city. Thus all businesses
which are engaged in selling goods, ·wares or merchandise at
wholesale in the city of lJOS Angeles and which are not licensed
by other sections of the ordinance come within section 21.166.
This is trne regar(Uess of whether they arc engaged in "manufacturing and selling" or merely "selling." The important
thing is that they are engaged in selling within the city of
Jjos Angeles. If they are so engaged, all gross receipts attribu-
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table to selling in the city of Los Angeles are subject to
the business license tax provided for by section 21.166. The
fact that the goods sold are produced in remote areas is
unimportant. It is algo immaterial whether they are produced
in a company owned plant or purchased from an independent
producer. The important thing is that the taxpayer is engaged
in selling goods at wholesale in the city of Los Angeles.
Section 21.166 of the tax ordinance was meant to cover
those businesses, not covered by other sections, which are
engaged in selling goods at wholesale in the city. It is so
worded to include those who manufacture and sell as well as
those who merely sell in the city. 'rhe fact that an organization
is engaged in selling in the city is sufficient and it is of no
import that selling is but a small part of the total effort or
that selling is not difficult for the instant company. There
is no reason to believe tbat the authors of section 21.166 were
concerned with the degree of effort or expense involved in the
selling of goods nor were they concerned with whether or
not selling >vas the dominant or incidental activity of the
company. The main concern would appear to be whether
or not the company was engaged in the selling of goods. The
purpose of the section was to place a business license tax on
those activities which took place within the city of Los Angeles
regardless of their relationship to activities outside the city.
[4] The defendant company has argued that the term
''selling'' was not intended to include other elements such as
"producing and selling" or "mining and selling," but rather
that it could only mean selling of a merchandising nature.
Such argument seeks to narrow the meaning of the words used
to the point of actually destroying the general purpose of
a "catch-all" section. The sale of goods is defined in section
1721(2) of our Civil Code as "an agreement whereby the
seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price." There is no requirement that
the seller must be in the merchandising business before thr
transaction can be called a sale and likewise it is not logical
to attempt to narrow the meaning of the term "selling" to
include only those whose dominant business is of a merchandising nature.
There is nothing in section 21J 66 or anywhere in the entire
taxing ordinance indicating that the word "se1ling" was only
meant to include businesses where selling was the dominant
part of a taxpayer's business. On the contrary section 21.08 ( t)
of the Los Angeles tax ordinance provides that ''The phrase
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'selling goods, wares and merchandise' shall, in addition to
any other meaning established at law, be deemed to extend
to and include in its application persons who engage in the
business of fabricating, serving or supplying, for a price,
tangible personal property furnished, produced or made at
the special order of purehasers or eonsumers, or for purehasers
or eonsumers who do or do not furnish, directly or indirectly,
th\~ specifications therefor." 1'hns the business of "selling"
ineludes not only those bm;inesses where merehandising is the
dominant element but also those businesses whieh are engaged
in "fabrieating, serving or supplying" goods for a price.
[5] In the case at bar defendant company, being a corporation, is a person as defined in section 21.08 (p) of the Los
Angeles tax ordinance. The petroleum products with which
it deals are considered in the nature of merchandise (West v.
Kansas 1Yatt1ral Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 [31 S.Ct. 564, 55 L.Ed.
716]) and the gross receipts of defendant company are derived
from the sale of snch mel'chandise. Most negotiations for these
!'ales were conducted through the defendant's Los Angeles
office and all the contracts were signed by defendant in Los
Angeles. Also payment for all sales is received from purehasers at the Los Angeles office. These faetors along with
the other stipulate(} facts make it apparent that defendant's
IJOS Angeles ofi1ce was engaged in the activity of "selling
goods, wares or men~hamlise at wholesale'' within the city of
Los Angeles and '''aR therefore subject to the provisions of
section 21.166 of the Los Angeles tax ordinance.
[6] The mere fact that the products sold never entered the
city of Los Angeles does not prevent the selling activities
from taking place in I1os Angeles. (McGoldrick v. BerwindWh?'te Coal Min. Co., 309 U.S. 33 [60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565,
128 A.L.R. 876].) The business license tax in question here,
is based on the fact that the selling activity is carried on within
the city and it is immaterial where the products are produced
or delivered. In the 1953 case of Keystone Metal Co. v. Pittsburgh, 374 Pa. 323 [97 A.2d 797], the sales transaction was
consummated in Pittsburgh but the goods were shipped from
a point outside Pennsylvania to a plant in New Jersey. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the receipts of
such sale should be illclmled in the measure of the city of Pittsburgh's license tax, based on gross receipts. The court held
that the selling activities within the city were sufficient to
sustain imposition of the tax even though delivery and passage
of title took place outside the city.
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Defendant co.mpany also contends that even if section 21.166
is applicable, the city cannot constitutionally tax the total
gross receipts of the company since such would be an attempt
to impose a tax on business carried on outside the city. This
argument is based on the ground that since the total gross
receipts include the proceeds of products produced and delivered outside the city the effect would be to allow a city to tax
transactions occurring outside its boundaries. This argument
seems to lose sight of the nature of section 21.166.
[7] The business license tax here sought to be collected
is a privilege tax, exacted for the privilege of engaging in
the activity of "selling." \Vhen this activity takes place
within the city, the rate of tax may be measured by the gross
receipts derived therefrom. (Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 53 Cal.App.2d 825, 830 [128 P.2d 408] .) As
stated by this court in ~Martin Ship Service Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 793, 796 [215 P.2d 24], "In view of the
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 [68 S.Ct. 1475,
92 L.Ed. 1832], and Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,
334 U.S. 653 [68 S.Ct. 1260, 92 L.Ed. 1633], the city may
clearly tax plaintiffs' local activities and the gross receipts
therefrom.'' In the case at bar it is true that some of
these gross receipts are attributable to extraterritorial elements such as the production and delivery of the goods.
However, there is no constitutional objection to resorting to
extraterritorial elements in determining the rate of tax. (Great
Atlant?:c & Pac. Tea Co. v. GrosJean, 301 U.S. 412 [57 S.Ct. 772,
81 L.Ed. 1193, 112 A.L.R. 293] ; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S.
525 [ 40 S.Ct. 2, 63 L.Ed. 1124] ; Cedar Hills Cemetery Corp.
v. DistTict of Col~rrnbia, 124 F .2d 286.) The activity being
taxed here is the activity of selling and such activity can be
taxed by the city even though the goods never enter its territorial limits. (Ileystone Metal Co. v. P1:ttsburgh, supm, 97
A.2d 797.)
In the instant case we can find no objection, constitutional
or otherwise, to the imposition of a business license tax on the
privilege of engaging in selling activities within the city.
Likewise there is no objection to basing the rate of such tax
on the gross receipts attributable to such selling activities,
even though various extraterritorial events contribute to
such gross receipts. [8] There is, however, one important
limitation which should be pointed out and that is this: even
though the city can tax the activity of selling it can only
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base the tax on such selling activities as are carried out within
its territorial limits. For this reason it is only those gross
receipts which are attributable to selling activities within
the city which should form the basis for the rate of tax. Gross
receipts attributable to selling activities conducted outside the
city should not be included. Such a construction necessarily
follows from the fact that the business license tax is on the
privilege of engaging in selling activities in the city of Los
Angeles and as such should only be based upon such activities.
In the case of Gotlieb v. City of Birmingham, 243 Ala. 579
[ 11 So.2d 363], the city ordinance imposed a tax on "each
packing house'' and on persons ''soliciting or selling packing
house products.'' In construing the scope of this city ordinance the court held that in computing the license tax, based
upon gross receipts, sales outside the territorial limits of the
city should not be included. In City.of Sedalia v. Shell Petrole~~m Corp. (C.C.A. 8th, 1936), 81 :F'.2d 193 [106 A.L.R. 1327],
a city license tax on persons engaged in the business of selling
gasoline, based on the number of gallons sold, was held to be
inapplicable to sales made outside the city. The court at page
196 stated that ''there is a presumption that the governing
body of the city was legislating with reference to the conduct
of business within the territorial limits of the city, and there
is nothing in the provision of the ordinances indicating that
it was the intention to give them extraterritorial effect."
[9] To allow a city to levy a license tax based upon gross
receipts attributable to selling activities outside the city would
be an unreasonable discrimination and a denial of equal protection of the law. (See Ferran v. City of Palo .Alto, 50 Cal.
App.2d 374 [122 P.2d 965] .) If such taxation were allowed it
would unjustly discriminate against those firms whose selling
activities in Los Angeles compose but a small fraction of the
total sales effort and whose gross receipts are in large part
attributable to selling activities in other areas. [10] As
stated in Franklin v. Peterson, 87 Cal.App.2d 727, 730 [197
P.2d 788], "It is the rule that where a statute or ordinance
is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render
it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, in whole or in
part, the court will adopt the construction which, without
doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used,
will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to
its constitutionality, even though the other construction is
equally reasonable. The rule is based on the presumption
that the legislative body intended not to violate the Constitu-
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tion, hut to make a valid statute or ordinance within the scope
of its constitutional powers.'' ln the instant case a just and
reasonable eonstruction rPquires that the measure of the tax
be limited to thosn gross reeeipts attribt1table to selling activities within the
of I,os Angeles.
It is also contended, by defendant company, that the plaintiff city's cause of action for the recovery of 1948 taxes is
barred by subdivision 1 of section 338 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Defendant had previously taken the position,
in the trial court, that the two-year limitation of section 339,
subdivision 1 (Code Civ. Proc.) might also be applicable but
in their appeal this view has been abandoned. Plaintiff argues
that the four-year period of section 343 is applicable, and it
therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the limitation period on the city's cause of action for taxes is governed
by the provisions of section 338, subdivision 1, or by the
provisions of section 343.
[11] Section 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that ''An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must
be commenced within four years after the cause of action
shall have accrued.'' In view of this wording section 343 can
only apply if no limitation period for the instant action is
provided for in the previous sections. Defendant company
contends that the instant cause of action by the city for taxes
comes within the limitation period of previous section 338,
subdivision 1, and therefore section 343 cannot apply. We
are inclined to agree.
The three-year limitation period of section 338, subdivision
1, which is applicable to ''an action upon a liability created
by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture,'' adequately
covers the instant cause.
It is true that section 338, subdivision 1, purports to cover
only those liabilities created by statute, but in King Mfg. Co. v.
Augusta, 277 U.S. 100 [48 S.Ct. 489, 72 L.Ed. 801], the
Supreme Court of the United States construed the word statute
as including municipal ordinances. Thus by the direct approach of construction it would be possible to say that the
instant license tax was a liability created by statute. It is also
possible to reach the same result by the indirect method since
we find that a liability created by statute is a liability which
would not exist but for a statute. (Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland v. Lindholm (C.C.A. 9th, 1933), 66 F.2d 56, 58 [89
A.L.R. 279] .) In the instant case the city license tax, though
42 C.2d-27
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the license ordinance could not
(:reatcr1 in the final instance
lm vP existed but for the pcrwer
to the city by the state
Constitution and statutes. This is true since "[m]unicipal
have no inherent power of taxation. On the
pm;;;ess with respect thereto
such power
to them
the constitution or statute.
3rd Ed., Vol. 16,
§ 44.05.)
of
70 Ohio .App. 337
[46 N.E.2d 325], it was held that the liability of a city to
pay a policeman's salary, which was provided for by city
ordinance as authorized by state statutes, was a liability
created by statute. Heasoning from this basis the Ohio court
held that the action for the recovery of such salary was barred
by the provisions of the limitation statute dealing with liabilities created by statute. Regardless of whether we prefer
this indirect approach or the direct approach of construing
the word statute to include ordinance, the inevitable conclusion is that the liability in question was created by statute and
therefore the limitation period of section 338, subdivision 1,
is applicable.
In the case at bar the three-year period of limitation
of section 338, subchvision 1, which is applicable, runs from the
time the rause of action accrues, and the cause of action accrues
~when the tax becomcfl delinquent. Since the tax due under section 21.166 must be paid before the close of business on the last
day of Pebruary of each year (sections 21.20 and 21.24.1 of the
Los .Angeles Tax Ordinance), the tax for the year 1948 was
delinquent on March 1, 1948. The three-year limitation period
which began to run from this date expired on March 1, 1951,
which was prior to the filing of the complaint by plaintiff
city, and, therefore, the city's cause of action for recovery of
the 1948 tax is barred.
\Ve hold, therefore, that the defendant company is subject
to the business license tax under the provisions of section
21.166 of the I.JOS Angeles tax ordinance as here construed
but that the city's cause of action to recover such tax for the
year 1948 is barred .
.Judgment reversed.
Shenk,

Edmonds, J., 'l'raynor, .J., Spence, J., and Bray,

,J. pro tem.,* concurred.

SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. It is my view that the opinion
prepared for the District Court of Appeal (reported at (Cal.
·*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

May 1954] RIAVE v. CoMMITTEE

OF

BAR ExAMINERS

835

[42 C.2d 835; 271 P.2d ll

App.) 260 P.2d 217), authored
Justice Fox and concurred in by Presiding ,Justice Moore and Justice McComb,
adequately discusses and correctly resolves the issues which
are presented on this appeal. For the reasons therein stated,
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June
23, 1954. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the
should be granted.
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LIONEL L. RIA VE, Petitioner, v. THE COMMITTEE OF
BAR EXAMINERS et al., Respondents.
[1] Evidence-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common knowledge that, immediately after commencement of hostilities in
Korea, many veterans of vVorld War II serving in reserve components were recalled to active service in that conflict.
[2] Attorneys-Admission to Bar-Eligibility.-Apparent purpose
of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6060.8, excusing requirement of final
bar examination where applieant for admission to practice,
after graduation from accredited law school and prior to next
final bar examination, shall have "entered upon active duty in
the armed forces during a period of hostilities between the
United States and any other nation," was to benefit those
veterans whose law study was interrupted by recall to military
service for extended periods made necessary by national emergency resulting from K.orean hostilities, and such purpose does
not contemplate annual short tours of duty for training, as
required of reserve officers.

PROCEEDING to review determination of Committee of
Bar Examiners denying an application for admission to practice law without examination. Petition denied.
Morse Erskine for Petitioner.
Jerold E. \Veil, Morrison, Hohfeld, Foerster, Shuman &
Clark and Richard J. Archer for Respondents.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 40.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence,§ 18; [2] Attorneys,§ 13.

